The 2006 midterm elections in Florida focused renewed attention on undervotes, instances where no candidate is selected in a given race. This interest was sparked by the high undervote countmore than 21,000 out of approximately 240,000 ballots cast-in the race for Florida's 13th Congressional seat. This race was decided by a margin of only 369 votes, and the numerous undervotes cast in it were highly concentrated in Sarasota County, one of five counties that contributes to the 13th Congressional District. Using ballot-and precinct-level voting data we show that the exceptionally high Sarasota undervote rate in the 13th Congressional District race was almost certainly caused by the way that Sarasota County's electronic voting machines displayed on a single ballot screen the Congressional contest and the Florida gubernatorial race. We buttress this claim by showing that extraordinarily high undervote rates were also observed in the Florida attorney general race in Charlotte and Lee Counties, places where the attorney general and gubernatorial races were combined on a single ballot screen. Using a precinct-level, statistical imputation model we find that there is a 98 percent chance that the Sarasota undervotes were pivotal in the 13th Congressional District race. With more precise estimates based on ballot data from Charlotte and Sarasota Counties, we find that there is essentially a 100 percent chance that the 13th Congressional District election result would have been reversed in the absence of the large Sarasota undervote.
Introduction
Despite widespread concerns that electronic voting machines adopted in the wake of the 2000 presidential election would wreak havoc on the 2006 midterm elections, in the aftermath of November, 2006 there were relatively few reports of election-altering voting machine failures. This fortunate situation arose even though these elections included a number of closely contested United States Senate (e.g., Virginia), United States House (e.g., the 2nd Congressional District in Connecticut), and state-level (e.g., the Vermont state auditor) races.
One could argue that the relative lack of post-election contentiousness in 2006 resulted from the recent replacement of old voting systems by electronic voting machines and the consequent diminishing of two types of voter errors, undervotes (instances where no candidate is selected in a race) and overvotes (where too many candidates are selected). Electronic voting machines reduce undervotes, it is believed, by reminding voters of races they have overlooked (Celeste, Thornburgh & Lin 2005) , and they prevent overvotes by not allowing too many candidates to be selected (Kimball 2003 , Carrier 2005 . Critics fear, nonetheless, that electronic voting machines are susceptible to tampering (e.g., Feldman, Halderman & Felten 2006) , and the debate surrounding electronic voting has thus been framed as balancing the benefits gained by reducing known sources of voter errors against the risk of tampering or technology failure.
The 2006 midterm elections have shown that this tradeoff is more complicated than had been realized and that perhaps one of the most important risks of electronic voting may be a new incarnation of an old problem. Rather than a security breach or catastrophic failure, the most notable controversy associated with electronic voting in November, 2006 was undervoting, a problem most often associated with punchcard voting, a technology that in almost all venues has been discredited. In Florida's 13th Congressional District (hereinafter CD 13), Democrat Christine Jennings lost the election night canvass to Republican Vern Buchanan by only 377 votes. An initial recount indicated that Buchanan beat Jennings by 119,142 to 118,741 votes-a margin of 401 votes-and used in Sarasota County, we can also say with very high confidence that many of the CD 13 undervotes cast in this county would have been valid votes had Sarasota early and election day voters been presented with the same voting machinery and ballot layouts used elsewhere in CD 13. Simply put, Christine Jennings would have been a member of the 110th Congress had Sarasota County early and election day voters not faced a problematic ballot format.
In Section 2 we provide background on the CD 13 race and present two competing explanations for the high undervote rate in this contest. In Section 3 we show that the cause of the undervote was a ballot format, and in Section 4 we show that the CD 13 outcome, Buchanan over Jennings by 369 votes, would almost certainly have been reversed in the absence of Sarasota undervotes.
Section 5 concludes.
Background and Explanations for CD 13 Undervote
Florida has 25 Congressional Districts and 67 counties, and midway up the state's Gulf Coast sits Sarasota County. Sarasota and its 156 election day precincts lie completely within the 13th
Congressional District which also includes parts of Charlotte County (eight election day precincts) and Manatee County (134 election day precincts, some of which are split between CDs 11 and 13) and all of DeSoto and Hardee Counties (15 and 12 election day precincts, respectively). 4 In November, 2006 the five CD 13 counties varied in their use of voting technologies: for their early and election day voters, Charlotte and Sarasota used iVotronic touchscreens, manufactured by Election Systems & Software (ES&S), whereas DeSoto, Hardee, and Manatee used optical scan voting. All five counties used optical scan voting for absentee voters.
Two competing explanations have been offered for the anomalous (greater than 8%) undervote rate in CD 13 and in particular for Sarasota County's undervote rate in the CD 13 race. Deliber-ate election fraud is not among the common conjectures. Rather, attention has focused on voter confusion arising from a ballot format and voting machine malfunction. 5
Ballot Format
The claim that ballot format caused the large CD 13 undervote in Sarasota County is best explicated with a comparison of the early and election day iVotronic ballot formats used in Sarasota and
Charlotte Counties. When a voter confronts an iVotronic, her "ballot" consists of a sequence of pages of races and corresponding candidate choices. In both Sarasota and Charlotte Counties, the first ballot page contained a single race, the Florida United States Senate contest.
Beyond their first pages, the Sarasota and Charlotte County ballots differed. The second page of the Sarasota County ballot featured two races, the CD 13 race and the Florida gubernatorial contest. See Figure 1 for pictures of the first two Sarasota ballot pages. In contrast, the Charlotte County iVotronic ballot featured a second page that contained the CD 13 race only; a third page with the Florida gubernatorial race along with the Florida attorney general race under it; and a fourth page with two Florida-wide races and a state legislative race. 5 Immediately after the November, 2006 elections various observers speculated that CD 13 voters may have undervoted in the CD 13 race as a protest against the negativity that characterized the Buchanan versus Jennings conteste.g., "Call for paper trail, new election," Herald Tribune, November 16, 2006 . This allegation is not compelling, though, because the CD 13 undervotes were concentrated in a single county (Sarasota) as opposed to being distributed across all of CD 13. Moreover, Sarasota County is not in a unique media market; if it were, campaign negativity could conceivably be concentrated there. Rather, Sarasota County is divided between the Tampa-Saint Petersburg-Sarasota DMA (which includes Sarasota, Manatee, and Hardee Counties) and the Fort Myers-Naples DMA (which includes Charlotte and DeSoto Counties). And, the set of broadcast television channels to which residents of CD 13 have access varies little across the five CD 13 counties. Of the 22 broadcast stations whose broadcast areas overlap CD 13, twelve can be seen by at least some of the voters in all five of the counties that constitute the district (cable providers generally carry local stations whose coverage area intersect the cable providers' service areas). At least one affiliate representing each of the four major networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX) reaches voters across all five counties in CD 13. Moreover, of the 21 stations that reach the center of Sarasota County, all but six also reach the center of the portion of Charlotte County that is contained in CD 13. Moreover, none of these six stations reach all of Sarasota County. Additional details on DMAs and CD 13 are available from the authors. In light of these details, we discount "protest undervotes" as a credible explanation for the CD 13 undervote. In what sense might Buchanan and Jennings have been "concealed?" The most commonly cited mechanism that may have led to Sarasota voter confusion pursuant to the CD 13 race revolves around the vertical stacking of the CD 13 contest (two candidates) above the gubernatorial contest (six candidates plus a write-in). The precise mechanism by which the stacking of two races, one with many candidates and one with two, may lead voters to miss the latter is beyond the scope of our analysis. Nonetheless, the extensive CD 13 undervote in Sarasota County is roughly consistent with Kimball (2007) , who argues that full-face touchscreen voting machines, as compared to scrolling touchscreens, may overwhelm voters and lead to excessive numbers of residual votes (undervotes plus overvotes).
Insofar as the second Sarasota ballot page contained two races whereas the first page contained only one, the second page was relatively overwhelming and cluttered. Janiszewski's (1998) experimental study of corneal movements shows that, the more cluttered a screen of information, the less respondents are able to learn from it.
Note as well the use of color in Sarasota's second ballot page- Figure 1 (b)-and in particular the color in the middle of this page. If a voter's eyes were drawn to this swath of color, it seems quite plausible that this would lead the voter to look down and hence not be aware of the CD 13 race above the colored area.
We suspect that the extent to which a given ballot page is perceived, consciously or not, as overwhelming or cluttered depends on a comparison of the page to the ballot pages that preceded it. By this logic, the CD 13 undervote in Sarasota County reflects the use of a relatively cluttered and complicated ballot page that follows an much less cluttered page.
If this allegation holds, then Charlotte County's third ballot page should have generated excessive undervotes as well. We turn to this possibility shortly.
It is known that ballot formats are not neutral in terms of affecting vote choices. Kimball & Kropf (2005) show that the way optical scan ballots are shaded and filled out (either with circles or arrows to be connected) affect vote choices; Wand, Shotts, Sekhon, Mebane, Jr., Herron & Brady (2001) show that the butterfly ballot format used in Palm Beach County, Florida, in November, 2000 altered the winner of the 2000 presidential election; and Koppell & Steen (2004) and Ho & Imai (2006) show that the order in which candidate names appear on ballots affects vote totals. Finally, Herrnson, Bederson, Niemi, Conrad, Hanmer & Traugott (2006) show that different touchscreen formats strongly affect the error rates voters make when selecting candidates.
Early and election day voters in the remaining counties in CD 13, DeSoto, Hardee, and Manatee, voted with paper-based, optical scan ballots. There is no sense in which optical scan voting involves repetitive page-turning as is required by iVotronic touchscreens. An example Manatee ballot is pictured in Figure 3 . 10 Absentee voters in all five CD 13 counties used optical scan ballots roughly similar to Manatee's election day ballot. *** Figure 3 about here ***
Voting Machine Malfunction
An alternative explanation for the high Sarasota undervote rate in CD 13 is voting machine malfunction. 11 A malfunction could reflect software counting bugs that caused undervotes; touchscreen misalignment problems that caused voters to "miss" candidates they intended to support; problems in touchscreen memory devices that caused corruption of voting data; and so forth. 
Undervoting in the Five CD 13 Counties
Figure 4 describes undervote rates for the five counties that contribute to CD 13. 12 The point in Figure 4 is simple: among CD 13 counties, Sarasota had the largest election day-absentee (and early-absentee) difference in undervote rates. In particular, on election day the CD 13 undervote rate in Sarasota County was approximately 0.139 (σ = 0.00116 whereσ denotes an estimated standard deviation), but Sarasota absentee voters had an undervote rate of approximately 0.0250 (σ = 0.00104). This translates to a difference of 0.114 (σ = 0.00239). Election day voters in 12 Figure 4 uses certified precinct returns except where they remain unavailable to the authors. As of this paper's writing the publicly-available canvass for DeSoto County does not break down CD 13 undervote counts by time of voting, i,e., election day, early, and absentee; moreover, we do not have access to a certified canvass from DeSoto County. Finally, the Figure 4 does not include Manatee County precincts that were split between CD 11 and CD 13. In contrast, there is a preponderance of Sarasota precincts, and only Sarasota precincts, above the 45-degree line in Figure 5 (b). The location of the Sarasota cloud implies that Sarasota precincts had election day CD 13 undervote rates greater than corresponding absentee CD 13 undervote rates.
Undervoting in CD 13 Precincts
On the other hand, Sarasota County's dots are not anomalous in Figure 5 (c), which describes undervoting in the Florida governor race. Indeed, this figure, in which all precincts are roughly clustered, looks very much like the Senate undervoting plot.
In the next race, attorney general, anomalous precincts again appear except the culprit now is Charlotte County. But after the attorney general race, the chief financial officer and commissioner of agriculture plots have no anomalous features. It is worthwhile noting that there is a large literature on voter "roll-off" (e.g., Vanderleeuw & Utter 1993 , Knack & Kropf 2003 , and it shows that, the lower down on a ballot a race appears, the greater the number of residual votes generally cast on it. Because the CD 13 and attorney general races are at the tops of the Sarasota and Charlotte County ballots, the undervote patterns noted for these two races cannot be attributed to fatigue-induced undervotes.
Undervoting in CD 11 and CD 14 Precincts
Thus far, when we observe among CD 13 counties a potentially confusing ballot format (e.g., the Sarasota County format in the CD 13 race and Charlotte County format in the Attorney General race) we also observe anomalous precinct-level undervoting; and, where ballot formats are not ostensibly confusing, we do not observe anything anomalous. We now continue to probe the connection between ballot formats and top race undervoting by turning to the top races in two neighboring Congressional Districts to CD 13, namely, Florida CDs 11 and 14.
13 See Table 1 for a description of election day and early voting technologies used in the counties that comprise CDs 11 and 14. All such counties used optical scan balloting for absentee voting. In light of these implications, Figure 6 is a collection of plots that are parallel to the earlier plots we saw for the precincts in CD 13. Namely, each piece of Figure 6 describes the election day and absentee undervote rates for a large set of precincts; precincts that are close to pictured 45-degree lines have election day and absentee undervote rates that are roughly similar; and, clouds of points We have estimated a variety of precinct-level regression models that cover CDs 11, 13, and 14, and in these models election day minus absentee undervote rates are regressed against various precinct demographics and other features (results available upon request). Even controlling for precinct features, the Charlotte, Lee, and Sarasota undervote anomalies remain and, notably, no other anomalies appear.
Summary of Evidence
We have now shown that a conjectured mechanism that induces high undervote rates-an ostensibly confusing ballot format-is present in our primary place of interest (Sarasota County); is present in other places with high undervote rates (Charlotte and Lee Counties); and is absent in places without high undervote rates. That is, county-race combinations with our mechanism have high election day-absentee undervote disparities, and county-race combinations without the mechanism lack corresponding disparities. This is compelling evidence in favor of the conjecture that the CD 13 undervote in Sarasota County was the result of a ballot format effect.
If one were to take seriously the notion that voter indifference induced by campaign negativity drove the Sarasota CD 13 undervote, one would have to argue that indifference over Florida attorney general candidates affected voters in Charlotte and Lee Counties. If Florida voters were indifferent between attorney general candidates, why would they act on this indifference in two counties only and why on election day but not during absentee voting?
Similarly, the evidence we have adduced makes a machine malfunction explanation for the Sarasota CD 13 undervote difficult to sustain. This is because, simply put, any explanation for the CD 13 undervote in Sarasota must be capable of explaining the attorney general undervote in Charlotte and Lee Counties and the lack of an attorney general undervote elsewhere (not to mention the lack of high undervotes in other races). If Sarasota experienced a voting machine malfunction that caused Congressional race undervotes (e.g., Dill & Wallach 2007 , Mebane & Dill 2007 , then this same malfunction appears to have affected two other neighboring counties but only in one particular race and not in the same race that the malfunction appeared in Sarasota. To the extent that ballot format explains the observed the Sarasota CD 13 undervote, the conjecture that engineering flaws are responsible for the undervote becomes more difficult to sustain. 
Consequences of the Sarasota Undervote in CD 13
What would have happened if the Sarasota County undervotes cast in the CD 13 race had followed patterns similar to those in the rest of CD 13? 15 This question turns on the issue of reallocating Sarasota undervotes between the CD 13 candidates, Buchanan and Jennings, and intentional undervotes. We consider undervote reallocation in two ways, first with precinct returns and second with ballot data.
Undervote Allocation with Precinct Returns
Our initial approach to Sarasota undervote reallocation relies on precinct-level election returns from Charlotte, Hardee, Manatee, and Sarasota Counties. As explained below, we use observed correlations between election results in CD 13 precincts outside Sarasota County to estimate CD 13 election results within Sarasota precincts.
Our precinct-level model for allocating Sarasota undervotes makes two key assumptions:
• The relationships between races are the same across all precincts in CD 13. That is, we assume that our ability to predict the outcome of one race (e.g., Florida attorney general)
given knowledge of a set of other race outcomes applies to precincts inside Sarasota County in the same way that it applies to precincts outside of it.
• From these assumptions we derive a statistical model for vote shares across precincts in CD 13 assuming that such shares as well as the proportion of voters intentionally undervoting are additive-logistic-normally distributed as in Katz & King (1999) . Once we specify a model for vote outcomes at the precinct level, we then treat CD 13 outcomes in Sarasota as missing and use multiple imputation to estimate what these outcomes would have been had Sarasota voters behaved like other voters in CD 13. Full technical details are in Appendix A.
Our imputation model generates a probability density over precinct voting outcomes and thus over election outcomes. We take one thousand random draws from this density and calculate one thousand predicted election outcomes for the CD 13 race (recall, our model treats CD 13 vote totals in Sarasota precincts as missing data). From these random draws we can answer key questions such as, what fraction of Sarasota undervotes were intended to have been cast for Buchanan and Jennings, and, how might these intended votes have influenced the election outcome if recorded?
Our imputation results are summarized in Table 2 , which provides estimated election results among early and election day voters in Sarasota County. Key here is how many more votes Buchanan and Jennings would have received if Sarasota undervotes had not been influenced by ballot design. This is expressed as the pickup for each candidate and for undervotes as well. The undervote pickup is negative because, according to our model, most undervotes were intended to have cast for Buchanan or Jennings. Vote totals and pickups reported in Table 2 are expected values, and associated 90% confidence intervals provide measures of uncertainty.
Looking first at early voting, the confidence interval for the undervoting column is -4,584 to -4,720; therefore, we are 90 percent confident that there would have been between 4,584 and 4,720 fewer early voting undervotes if there had been no ballot design problem in Sarasota County. We estimate that 2,477 voters intended to vote for Jennings and 2,107 voters intended to vote for Buchanan in early voting.
With respect to election day voting, we are 90 percent confident that Jennings would gain between 5,078 and 5,996 more votes in Sarasota had there been no ballot design issues. Similarly, To estimate the probability that a given Charlotte voter would vote in the CD 13 race given her votes and undervotes for other offices (specifically, United States Senate, chief financial officer, commissioner of agriculture, Amendment 8, and the retention of Supreme Court Justice Lewis),
we use the logit models in Table 3 , column one. Because only 7,326 of Charlotte's election day and early voters lived in CD 13 and only 174 of those undervoted, we cannot confidently estimate the probability of participation in the CD 13 race conditional on voting in other races in a fully nonparametric way. However, by including a number of interaction terms in our logit specification, we allow for a good deal of flexibility. As a robustness check, several non-parametric allocations are provided in Appendix B. For reasons that will be become clear shortly, we also require estimates of the probability that each voter in Sarasota County votes or undervotes in the CD 13 race given her other voting decisions-see Table 3 , second column.
To estimate how Sarasota CD 13 undervotes that should have been valid votes would have been voter i we can consider the event C i in which the voter undervotes using a Charlotte machine and the event S i in which the voter undervotes using a Sarasota machine. We assume that any voter who undervotes in Charlotte would undervote if voting in Sarasota; formally, S i ∩ C i = C i . To allocate Sarasota undervotes, we require estimates of the probability of C i given S i . That is, we need to know the probability that each Sarasota undervoter would continue to undervote if using Charlotte machines. By definition, P (C i |S i ) = P (C i ∩ S i ) /P (S i ), which in this case is simply
Estimates of P (S i ) and P (C i ) are obtained from the logit regressions described above. Given these estimates of P (C i |S i ) and the probability of voting for Buchanan or Jennings conditional on voting at all, it is a simple matter of multiplication to assign to each Sarasota CD 13 undervoter a probability of continuing to undervote, supporting Buchanan, or supporting Jennings.
Summing these probabilities across all Sarasota CD 13 undervoters yields the reallocation in Table   4 . Confidence intervals were obtained via a bootstrap. As compared to our precinct-level results, here we find stronger evidence that Jennings would 16 Among other things this assumption requires that there were no other layout or machine issues in Sarasota or Charlotte that we are not accounting for.
have won the CD 13 election if Sarasota had used the same machines as were used in Charlotte County. Our individual ballot data reallocation suggests the Sarasota undervotes would have produced a net swing of 3,068 and 3,359 votes in favor of Jennings with a point estimate of 3,215. This is roughly twice as many votes as is implied by our precinct-level reallocation model. Note the precinct-level confidence interval was plus or minus roughly 959 votes. Here the confidence interval is only plus or minus 146 votes. Thus, through the use of ballot-level data, we improved the precision of our estimates more than six-fold.
Conclusion
The motivation for this paper is the unusually high undervote rate in the November, 2006 13th Congressional District race in Florida. This race featured Republican Vern Buchanan versus Democratic Christine Jennings, Buchanan was declared the winner by 369 votes, and he was sworn into the 110th Congress in January, 2007.
We have offered two conclusions regarding the plethora of Sarasota County undervotes in the 13th Congressional District race, the first pertaining to cause and the second to consequences. With respect to the former, we have argued that the cause of the Sarasota undervote was a confusing ballot format. Our evidence for this claim draws on variance in ballot formats across counties and types of voters (early, election day, and absentee). In particular, we highlighted the way that the touchscreen voting machines in Sarasota County grouped races and in particular grouped a Congressional race with the Florida gubernatorial race. The problematic grouping that Sarasota employed-having a two-candidate United States House race on the same touchscreen page as the Florida gubernatorial race-was employed by other counties, albeit with different races, and in these other counties and associated races we find anomalous undervoting. Moreover, where a confusing grouping of races is absent, anomalous undervoting is absent as well.
Thus, what looks on the surface like a unique Sarasota County problem or an issue idiosyncratic to Florida's 13th Congressional District that appeared in November, 2006 is in fact more general.
The ballot format effect we have identified appears generic, and this finding should contribute to research on optimal ballot design.
With respect to our second conclusion, like the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County in the 2000 presidential race the Sarasota ballot format in the 2006 midterm elections was pivotal to the winner of tightly-contested 13th Congressional District race. We estimate that, had Sarasota County used a ballot format akin to those in neighboring counties, Jennings would have beaten Buchanan. Indeed, our ballot-level analysis leaves virtually no doubt that the excess Sarasota undervote would have broken in Jennings's favor in a manner that would have easily reversed the certified election outcome.
There remain two key issues over which we do not have leverage. The first is the precise reason as to why grouping races on touchscreens is a problem. Is the issue asymmetry between races, i.e., a race with two candidates grouped with a race with multiple candidates? Or, is it total number of candidates on a page? Or, is the issue vertical stacking of races versus horizontal grouping?
Or, is there a tradeoff between grouping races and the number of pages in a ballot wherein greater Second, and as mentioned previously on several occasions, because we have presented a statistical analysis of vote patterns and not a physical examination of voting machines, we cannot completely rule out voting machine malfunction as a source of the Sarasota undervote. Is it technically possible that software or hardware glitches are responsible for the Sarasota Congressional race undervote, the Charlotte and Lee attorney general undervotes, the apparent ballot format effects in Collier County, and so forth? Yes, we believe that this is possible. However, if the issue is a software or hardware glitch, the glitch would have had to have manifested itself among almost all voting machines in Sarasota County but affected only one race and then have manifested itself in almost all machines in Charlotte and Lee Counties yet affected a different race.
We conclude with what we believe is a clear implication of our results: touchscreen ballot formats can affect vote counts in a dramatic way and, as the Florida CD 13 contest illustrates, they can be pivotal to election outcomes. While we have identified one problematic format, we have not offered an assessment of what is the best format for a typical voter. And furthermore, we have said nothing about problematic formats in other voting technologies, none of which, one would imagine, is neutral. The matter of what the best format might be remains a subject of ongoing research.
A Appendix: Precinct-level CD13 undervote allocations
This appendix explains the procedures we used to allocate Sarasota County's election day and early voting CD 13 undervotes with precinct-level voting returns.
A.1 Compositional Transformations
For the various counties considered here we know how many votes were cast in each precinct for each ballot choice (Republican, Democratic, or Undervote) and by each voting method (early voting, election day voting, and absentee voting).
17 Let V e,m i,c represent the vote share in precinct i, race e, by method m ∈ {early, e.d., abs.}, for choice c ∈ {D, R, U }.
For any given race and voting method (that is, temporarily ignoring superscripts), individual vote shares are constrained to the simplex,
and the set of votes in a precinct across the three choices sums to unity,
The space of each vector V i is therefore the three dimensional simplex. For compositional data in a J-dimensional simplex, the transformation of Aitchison (1986) 
The set of log vote ratios Y are now individually and collectively unconstrained. Examination of such ratios in other contexts has found them to be well fitted by a multivariate t or multivariate normal distribution (Katz & King 1999 , Jackson 2002 , Tomz, Tucker & Wittenberg 2002 . Thus.
our key modeling assumption is that collectively Y i are joint multivariate normal across all relevant c, e, and m. The reverse transformation from Y to V implies that the vote shares themselves are distributed additive-logistic-normal.
A.2 Imputation
Define S as a dichotomous indicator that is one in Sarasota county and zero elsewhere; let V and Table 5 lists the twelve election methods we include in our imputation model. The vote shares from each method are transformed into two log vote ratios, the ratio of the Republican to Democratic vote and the ratio of the undervote to the Democratic party vote share. 18 . We omit the gubernatorial race because it was the race that shared a ballot screen with the CD 13 race in Sarasota
County. Absentee votes for the CD 13 race are included as forecasting variables as these ballots are paper. We include all precincts in CD 13 from Charlotte, Hardee, Manatee, and Sarasota Counties except the small number of precincts in Manatee that were split between the CD 11 and CD 13 races. As a point of notation, from this point onward we refer to the log vote ratios in the early and election day voting in the CD 13 race as Y 's and the log ratios of all these other races in Table 5 pletely missing data (with observed covariates X), then our model has the same architecture as any conventional multivariate normal imputation model (Rubin 1987 , Schafer 1997 , King, Honaker, Joseph & Scheve 2001 . We can estimate the posterior distribution of the missing values and draw imputations from this distribution to create fully observed datasets from which it is straightforward to create quantities of interest such as the vote totals of each candidate.
However, as there are only two patterns of missingness in our data, the critical complication of imputation algorithms, running large numbers of simultaneous equations, can be avoided.
19
Ignoring covariance between early and election day returns, within the CD 13 race the imputation model is simply two sets of bivariate normal regressions:
where X consists of 14 log vote ratios from the elections in Table 5 
A.3 Constraints
Observed CD 13 vote shares in Sarasota County contain some information about latent values.
If the Sarasota CD 13 ballot format had been equivalent to the ballot format used in other CD 13 counties, then it is reasonable to assume that some Sarasota ballots which contain CD 13 undervotes would have registered a vote for a candidate while no votes successfully cast for either candidate would change. Thus, in Sarasota County the vote shares for both Buchanan and Jennings must be strictly increasing in undervotes and the share of undervotes correspondingly decreasing.
Moreover, there are upper bounds for how much Buchanan and Jennings vote shares could change if all Sarasota CD 13 undervotes were allocated to these two candidates. Thus, the observed vote 19 All observations are either fully observed or are missing the four log ratios of early and election day voting in the CD 13 race.
shares in Sarasota give us a series of bounds on the latent vote shares:
These bounds on * V imply a set of bounds on * Y , the most straightforward of which is:
Additionally, if we knew the true undervote, * V i,U , we could define the functions:
which provide bounds on
We simplify these functions to their limiting values as *
Using equation 9 and the simplified form of equation 12 we can set the limits of integration for:
while the precincts outside Sarasota more straightforwardly contribute:
A.4 Rejection Sampling
We parametrically bootstrap the parameters from our imputation model. From each bootstrapped set of parameters we create one imputed dataset where all the election outcomes are the same as observed values except that early and election day CD 13 vote shares in Sarasota County precincts are draws from their posterior distributions, conditional on other observed elections in those precincts.
Although five or ten imputed datasets is sufficient in most analyses, we want to create confidence intervals of some quantities and so impute 1,000 datasets.
Our imputation model as previously discussed is multivariate normal in the space of the Y s.
The quantities of interest, however, are the vote totals for each candidate. This requires transforming imputed log vote ratios back to vote shares and then multiplying these vote shares by the total turnout in each precinct. The reverse transformations are:
where
Our imputed values are drawn from an untruncated conditional posterior yet we want values conditional on V . Therefore we need draws from a truncated distribution that obeys Such an approach has both advantages and disadvantages. The principle advantage is that it allows us to base our allocations on only those Charlotte voters who otherwise voted in exactly or almost exactly the same way as a given Sarasota CD 13 undervoter. However, as the number of races on which voters are matched increases, the number of times that any given pattern of votes is observed declines and it becomes more difficult to predict how a voter casting any given pattern of other votes would vote in the CD 13 race. In our application, this "curse of dimensionality" creates not only uncertainty but potentially bias.
Notwithstanding this potential bias, in Table 6 we present allocations of the Sarasota CD 13 undervote based on matching ballots of undervoters in Sarasota to ballots from Charlotte County CD 13 precincts. We provide three separate allocations. The first matches on the same offices considered in the logit model presented in the text-see Table 3 ; the second considers only the top four offices; and, the third matches on all 18 common offices. Bootstrapped confidence intervals are provided for each allocation. 20 Where possible, exact matches for each of the 17,825 Sara-20 AUTHORS NOTE: The match on all offices is computationally intensive and the bootstrap is still running as of sota CD 13 (early and election day) undervotes are found. Where exact matches are not found, best matches are established via a simple scoring algorithm that assigns precedence to ballots that match undervote choices and which prefers matching votes for different minor-party candidates to matching votes for different major-party candidates. 21 We find that the parameters of the matching algorithm had little effect on the allocation. The approximate matches are enumerated separately from the exact matches in Table 6 . Except in the case in which matching is attempted across all 18 common contests, the number of ballots for which approximate matching is applied is relatively small.
Overall, the non-parametric allocations are very similar to what we found with our semiparametric logit estimator. Nonetheless, all of the non-parametric allocations find more votes for both Buchanan and for Jennings than the model presented in the text and find also a larger net advantage for Jennings. Differences are on the order of a few hundred votes.
The "curse of dimensionality" problem associated with our non-parametric estimates is revealed in the results by the decreasing number of Sarasota CD 13 undervote ballots that are predicted to remain undervotes as the number of races on which voters are matched is increased.
Matching on only four offices yields a prediction of 2,540 undervotes, whereas matching on 18 offices yields 1,084 undervotes. The reason for this is that, as of the number of offices matched on increases, each voter shares her vote pattern with fewer and fewer other voters. For example, when matching on 18 races there are well over 400 million possible voting patterns, and 5,146 of the 17,825 ballots to be allocated were unique within Sarasota county.
We estimate the probability of undervoting using Charlotte County ballots and machines given an undervote in Sarasota as the Charlotte undervote probability divided by the Sarasota undervote probability (for a given vote pattern). For any CD 13 undervoter who cast a unique vote pattern within Sarasota, the non-parametrically estimated ex ante probability of undervoting in Sarasota June 25, 2007. 21 The computer code that implements the matching and allocation is available from the authors by request. Whether one prefers the more general analysis presented here or the more conservative analysis presented in the body of the paper, the conclusions are the same. The overvote in Sarasota was excessive even controlling for other voting behavior and the CD 13 election's result would have surely been reversed in the absence of the excess undervote. 
